Because the international arena is too focused on the interests of big states as structuring international interactions, small states continue to appear merely as objects (versus subjects) in the eyes of a large number of researchers, sometimes unconsciously following the (neo)realist tradition of International Relations (IR). Consequently, small states appear to be devoid of any analytical interest. In fact, such a trend in the field of IR neglects the significance of ever increasing interactions between states. Moreover, these interactions need not reflect incompatible interests of different states. The article argues that the case of the reconstruction process of Afghanistan, implemented by the international community, presents a positive-sum logic. In other words, the efforts of the coalition in the Afghan territory allow the engaged states, be they big or small, to pursue their own interests. The degree of their contributions corresponds to the benefits their engagement might provide. As the analysis of the Lithuanian case demonstrates, a small state need not be a passive object
INTRODUCTION
The practice of international community engagement in regions suffering from all kinds of unrest is far from being a novel tendency in the inter-state arena. Yet we should rather talk about a multidimensional practice, since it is seldom of a homogeneous nature and is rarely characterized by the same degree of intensity.
To put it differently, divergences might be detected not only in international engagement strategies, for instance, at the tactical or operational levels, but also in the predisposition of states or international institutions to pledge their commitment.
The general analytical framework of this article draws on the reconstruction activities carried out by the international community in Afghanistan. More precisely, the empirical center of attention will be limited to the Lithuanian government"s engagement in this process.
The international conflict in question might seem to lack empirical, theoretical and moral challenges for researchers in the field of IR. This is mostly due to the seemingly crystal-clear solidarity of the allies with regard to international efforts to combat terrorism. It is however assumed in this article that academic discussions or research on the process of reconstruction of Afghanistan are far from being exhausted, especially if one wishes to understand the complexity of interactions between the allies. Furthermore, as far as Lithuania specifically is concerned, constructive debates on Afghanistan are absent at the national level, which might confirm that the Lithuanian government"s obligation to contribute to the global security remains unquestionable and cannot generate any additional argument, apart from those put forward by the Western countries (such as defending Western civilization 1 ).
The Lithuanian engagement in Afghanistan as a study case can contribute to answering the question whether it is possible for a small state to pursue its own national interests on an international scale. The article does not intend to evaluate the ongoing conflict on moral grounds.
My research issue should not be associated with the academic debates or methodology, entitled to classify states on a strictly quantitative basis. The current analysis is supposed to eventually negate the relevance of such debates.
2 It will also relativize the (neo)realist thesis of IR, which focuses on the rationality as well as pre-determined interests of states, and according to which small states are limited in their actions because of the impact of structural forces at the 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LITHUANIA-SPECIFIC SECURITY FIELD
The international community engagement in Afghanistan, having resulted from the terror attacks of September 11 against the US, conforms to the collectivesecurity logic. In this case, the objective to be collectively eliminated is the existing terror threat. It is however argued here that the international coalition member states are apt to pursue their own specific security interests which need not be equivalent to the declared combat against terrorism. 10 Such an articulation of state interactions allows for assuming an interrelationship between the degree of intensity of a given country"s engagement and the national (or private versus collective) benefits procured in the process.
THE COLLECTIVE ACTION LOGIC
Terrorist networks might be analysed as a transnational challenge, i.e. apt to incapacitate sovereign states to guarantee their national security by their own efforts 11 , hence the necessity of international cooperation, which usually faces difficulties relative to collective action.
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The concept of collective action, which can be defined as "a more or less coordinated process of collective mobilization, having as its target to defend a specific group"s symbolic or material interests" 13 , provides a possible axis of 8 (November 17, 2008 ) // http://www3.lrs.lt/docs2/KCQRLFQZ.PDF (accessed March 23, 2010) . 9 I will note that here Atlanticism is conceived in terms of perception of the US as an existential security guarantor by the Central and Eastern European countries. 10 this very tradition provided my research question.
Foreign Policy Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania
The Afghan issue presents several elements conforming to the classical theory of IR, the security theme and the military nature of the conflict being the most obvious ones. With regard to security, some authors tend to perceive it as a direct outcome provided by the possession of military means. 22 Consequently, a potential engagement of the member states of a given alliance might be measured according to their military capacity. 23 As considered by the classical tradition, the physical dimension of a state (or its relative power capacities) influences its security and foreign policy. 24 Suffering from lacking material resources, small states seek additional means which might contribute to the enhancement of their national security.
Considering conceptual efforts to define a small state, it seems that no universally relevant definition has been found. 25 would however require more explanations than it could provide answers, so I will limit myself to the physical parameters.
It is as well to be noted that, with the view of avoiding a too much ample diversification of engagement of the allies in Afghanistan, I will focus on the NATO member states. 29 This methodological choice is due to the assumption that contributions of the member states of the Alliance to the Afghan reconstruction efforts should reflect proportionally similar quantitative and similar qualitative specificities because of more rigid commitments associated with an alliance than it would be the case, for instance, in a coalition. 30 If we briefly and simply compare the physical data of the 28 NATO member countries, we will notice that there are only 6 countries with a smaller population , whose largest majority was deployed in Ghor. 41 Lithuania also deploys military personnel from the squadron of special forces "Aitvaras″. 42 Since the official Project Coordinator (March 31, 2010 ). This article is based on research carried out within the framework of a Master thesis which was finalized in June 2010. The majority of the interviews with Lithuanian ministerial and parliamentary authorities, referred to in this article, were realized by e-mail correspondence. A few information documents mentioned in the article were also provided by specific authorities via e-mail. 35 From a conceptual point of view, the Lithuanian case might be considered as an "empirical anomal[y]″ of collective action. 55 Yet, as I will try to show, it allows for answering affirmatively to Olson Jr. and Zeckhauser"s question as to whether national interests influence the intensity of a given state"s engagement within the framework of collective action. 56 In other words, semi-private or private benefits provided simultaneously with the collective ones contribute to a more equal burden-sharing. Small states in alliances indeed appear to be capable of pursuing strategic actions, with the view of ensuring their own security, while at the same time contributing to the stability and efficiency of international structures. 57 This assumption is largely compatible with the idea of diverging threats which influence security interests of different states.
FEAR OF RUSSIA'S NEIGHBOURHOOD
Lithuania"s solid identification with NATO within the framework of the Afghan conflict is associated in the article with Atlanticism: as argued by Česlovas
Laurinavičius, Raimundas Lopata and Vladas Sirutavičius, the integration to the West made Lithuanian politicians seek support on the side of "the strongest". 58 I
argue that the Afghan conflict provides Vilnius with the possibility to gain security dividends from the American government vis-à-vis Russia.
The fear of Russia, still relevant in Eastern Europe, corresponds to the conception of traditional fear, which appeals to geographical proximity of the USSR successor and the recent memory of the Soviet occupation. 59 Although one might discern some signs of political rechauffement, especially after new Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė came into power 60 , such optimistic considerations have not yet endured the challenge of longevity, which would make their analysis somewhat speculative. Moreover, popular reaction as it is voiced in national media with regard to the above-mentioned rechauffement appears to be negative. 61 However, it does not seem relevant to seek sophisticated causes having brought about such social realities in the region: the Russo- Lithuanian relations can be explained by the argument that "long-lasting years of wars, servitude, national oppression, and Russification shaped the approach towards Russia as an eternal and extremely dangerous enemy″. 62 At this point we might briefly refer to the messages which appeared in the Lithuanian as well as international media as to the Baltic trio"s reaction to the French-Russian commercial deal concerning Mistral military ships 63 . Military analysts in the Baltic states voiced their fear that "the vessels would change the balance of power in the region″. 64 Yet in order to reveal a more profound significance of this transfer, it is necessary to refer to a third category of actors, i.e.
France and Germany, the biggest European states, which tend to provide Russia with preferential treatment, at the expense of the Baltic interests. 65 Intellectual efforts to conceptualize EU-Russian relations are certainly well known to the Lithuanian academic tradition. For instance, Lopata, when analysing the EU"s rapprochement to Russia, argues for the former"s conviction that Russia is indispensible in creating "the European security architecture". 66 Vytautas Radţvilas, in his turn, notes that the ultimate objective of relations between the most influential EU member states and Russia is "a long-standing strategic partnership″. 67 In this light, the transfer of Mistral military ships might be perceived not as "an ordinary technical affair″, but as a germ of a military and political alliance; this mutual rapprochement is even more facilitated by the post-Cold-War absence of ideological or political obstacles. 68 Moreover, Brussels and Moscow might also find common grounds in their anti-American stance and aspiration to come back to "the foreground of the world history and politics.″ 69 historically significant event resulted in specific deep-rooted associations manifest in the region, such as the re-establishment of national independence thanks to military power.
As argued by Barry Buzan, security is one of the state action stimuli, as is the case with power; however, consequent state action trajectories as to these respective motives are not the same. 74 According to Buzan, the classical tradition of IR perceives states as obeying the logic of fight for power, while security is reduced to a mere outcome of the latter. 75 Criticising such a materialist conception of security as too limited, Buzan argues for the complexity of security as a research object in its own right in social sciences. 76 The inoperability of the concept of power is also obvious in the discussions about small states, since analysing state action trajectories based on the (material) power dimension reduces a small state"s subjecthood in the international arena. 77 On the contrary, the priority given to the pursuit of state security (versus power)
interests objectivize the general condition of states: in this case, all of them might be perceived as being able to pursue their own interests and, more importantly, to achieve favourable outcomes. As for national security, it is argued that it may be reinforced not only by a direct proliferation of material resources, but also thanks to the consolidation of a state"s integration within international structures, hence the importance of the social aspect of the inter-state arena.
This social element is also at the basis of the process of securitization allowing states to proceed with creating new frameworks of global politics. 78 According to
Buzan, the threat of terrorism constitutes a successful "macrosecuritization"
undertaken by Washington and it benefits from an ample intersubjective recognition as an existential threat, significantly influencing political processes on an international scale. 79 The September 11 attacks indeed resulted in shifting priorities on the security agenda of the majority of states.
80
As for Lithuania and terrorism, it is to be noted that the NATO Summit of November 2002 (Prague), during which discussions regarding the new NATO conception of war against terror took place, had a symbolic meaning for Lithuania, since it was invited to start negotiations for its membership in the Alliance. 81 Lithuania"s preparations for the process had already been started prior to that date:
for example, in January of the same year, the Lithuanian government had adopted a programme against terrorism, stipulating participation in the international community activities to counter terror as one of the national priorities in the domain. 82 Official statements taken over from the Western discourse and put forward by Lithuanian authorities as well as the setting up of new military units 83 provide
Lithuania with the possibility of being understood (contrary to its position with regard to Russia) and recognised by the international community as a member of the Western community. Referring to this perspective, we can argue that the threat of terror constitutes one of the practical axes along which the recognition of the Eastern European countries by their Western neighbours might take place. Achievements (and failures) within the evolution of this process of recognition might be sought in the political discourse; this choice of method is validated by the assumption that the above-mentioned securitization process is highly politicized, and one can analyse it directly 86 , that is to say, via public statements.
The solidity of the Lithuanian-American cooperation does not seem to have ever lacked strong political declarations: in March of the last year the American Ambassador to Lithuania Anne E. Derse expressed her satisfaction with the "superb security partnership″ between Vilnius and Washington. 87 Having paid tribute to Lithuania for its solid position with regard to the collective defense in Afghanistan, she distinguished the Lithuanian government as one of the largest contributors to the NATO efforts in Afghanistan in terms of the size of population and GDP.
Similar elements of such political discourse can also be detected in statements made by NATO officers in general 88 and by the general secretary of the Alliance in particular. 89 As for representatives of the Lithuanian elite, they tend to appeal to Lithuania"s better recognition among the Alliance member states by putting forward a more weighty position of Vilnius in the process of decision-making within NATO. ; according to him, the international system has undergone a structural shift, which is reflected in an enhanced normative role of morality.
REDEFINITION OF POWER IN FAVOUR OF SMALL STATES
The Afghan conflict should not be exclusively associated with the strategy to counter insurgents, which is dominated by military force. From an ideological point of view, the war against terror is strongly linked to the defense of the Western liberal democratic civilization. The aim to establish a stable and pacific environment in Afghanistan is based on the logic of democratization, hence a normative content of the activities implemented by the allies in the region.
As argued by some authors, the tactics of soft (versus hard) power is by far associated the September 11 events with attacks against freedom and democracy.
Similarly, Lithuanian representatives described them as "a challenge to the whole civilized and democratic world, to freedom, the world community, principles of coexistence and humanism" 109 , to "the Western civilization and its values". 110 The stance of the Lithuanian political elite, though intuitively rational, confirms Ned Lebow"s thesis, according to whom "political units" are predisposed to adapt to the environment perceived as their own, and to gravitate towards influence leverages which they consider as the most efficient. The Lithuanian expertise (if not a comparative advantage) concerning the command of the PRT of Ghor might be sought in the national "experience of transition from autocracy to democracy and from planned to market economy, Eurointegration process, successful state-building". 113 Vilnius should therefore be apt to help its neighbours carry out transformational processes. 114 As for Ghor, Vilnius is implementing its efforts in the region in order to consolidate the rule of law, develop the country"s economy and infrastructure, as well as to promote good practices, rights and liberties. 115 Consequently, Lithuania seems to be acting within the framework of its declared political competence.
Democracy promotion corresponds to a normative dynamics typical of the Western community. Speaking of Afghanistan, the command of the PRT of Ghor, characterized by a strong civil dimension, confers on Lithuania greater visibility and might constitute a normative leverage. This assumption seems to be validated by the fact that the strategy of visibility and development cooperation is officially recognised as conforming to the principles of the Lithuanian foreign policy. ; also, the Lithuanian contribution might be described as "disproportionally significant", especially considering the fact that "no other country of such a size and of such limited resources has taken up a PRT command", which makes the Lithuanian mission "really grand". 
EXCEPTIONALITY OF LITHUANIA'S ENGAGEMENT

PROFITABILITY OF EXPERTISE IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
The process of integration takes different forms and is supposed to relieve small states from the domination of their powerful counterparts. 124 Such an assumption appeals to shifts in power criteria no longer conforming to the military or economic logic. At this point we can once again, yet more concretely, invoke the concept of normative power, also referred to as "the power of ideas".
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Christine Ingebritsen, in her analysis of the Scandinavian countries, arrives at the conclusion that the Nordic states managed to emerge as "a moral superpower". 126 She argues that Scandinavian representatives play a significant role within international institutions when there is room for suggesting new ideas and reinforcing existing norms. One such norm is in fact the participation in international missions where the civil dimension is the dominant one.
We can refer at this point to another Nordic author Uffe Balslev"s standpoint, according to whom Denmark"s entrance to NATO cannot be uniquely associated with the provision of security dividends. In the case of Denmark, its NATO membership constitutes only one aspect of its wider engagement in the international arena 127 (Denmark is for example also actively involved in UN peace seems to provide credibility to such a foreign policy orientation. Yet Vilnius, mostly because of its lack of experience, has much difficulty in achieving tangible results.
The normative cause appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy promotion. 
RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES AS
231
The fact that the allies do not manifest the same level of engagement in Afghanistan is attributed in this article to their divergent national interests 163 or, more precisely, to the benefits a specific country is able to reap thanks to its engagement in Afghanistan. Lithuania"s active commitment to the coalition forces is explained by the possibility of its deeper integration within the West.
The engagement of Vilnius in Afghanistan might be considered as a strategy which provides the Lithuanian government with the possibility to gain reputation defined as "a judgement of someone"s character (or disposition) that is then used to predict or explain future behaviour". 164 In other words, reputation is based on the coherence of a state"s actions. It refers to the interdependence between the same state"s past actions and those to be expected in the future. As for Lithuania, it might be argued that, having only recently regained its independence and become a subject at the international level, it still lacks credibility.
Declared as being at the top of the national foreign policy priorities, Lithuania"s engagement in Afghanistan provides Vilnius with a practical window of opportunity to become a full-fledged member of the Transatlantic community.
However, this politics of becoming should not be seen as a strategy conforming to a somewhat universal essence or a deterministic and inevitable condition. Lastly, it is important to note that the most serious challenge the Lithuanian government seems to be facing is -paradoxically -an internal (versus international) one. The political strata in Lithuania appear to be lacking democratic legitimacy in the sense that there is a disjuncture between the political elite 168 and an emerging civil society. Such a defective national cohesion, wherever it is manifest, might condemn any state to being weak. Once the Lithuanian government succeeds in solving this problem, it will gain more credibility on an international scale in order to advance with confidence the principles of its own foreign policy. 167 Račius, supra note 154. 168 According, for instance, to Jasutis, debates on the Afghan issue should not take place within the civil society, since its members are simply devoid of much information qualified as "confidential" (Jasutis, supra note 151).
